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ABSTRACT: We examine the causes and consequences of European real estate firms’ decisions 
to provide investment property fair values prior to the required disclosure of this information 
under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  We find evidence that investor 
demand for fair value information—reflected in more dispersed ownership—and a firm’s 
commitment to transparency increase the likelihood of providing fair values prior to their 
required provision under International Accounting Standard 40 – Investment Property.  We also 
find that firms not providing these fair values face higher information asymmetry.  However, we 
fail to find that the relatively higher information asymmetry was reduced following mandatory 
adoption of IFRS.  Rather, we find that differences in information asymmetry largely remain.  
Taken together, this evidence suggests that common adoption of fair value accounting due to the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS does not necessarily level the informational playing field. 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
The required adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the 
European Union (EU) effective January 1, 2005 resulted in a number of significant changes in 
how firms report their financial results.  Mandatory IFRS adoption has been criticized for both 
the flexibility afforded under the standards and the encroachment of the fair value paradigm.  
Specifically, common accounting standards alone may not be sufficient to provide the benefits of 
common accounting practices.  The convergence of accounting practices requires effective 
implementation and enforcement of accounting standards (e.g., Ball 1995, 2006; Ball et al. 2003; 
Burgstahler et al. 2006; Daske et al. 2007a, 2007b). 
This study investigates whether diversity in the choice of fair value information in the 
European investment property industry prior to the mandatory adoption of International 
Accounting Standard 40 – Investment Property (IAS 40) resulted in information asymmetry 
differences across firms, and whether mandatory adoption of IAS 40 mitigated such differences.  
Prior to the mandatory adoption of IAS 40, investment property firms varied considerably in 
their reporting of this asset, from fair value recognition on the balance sheet, to historical cost on 
the balance sheet with fair value disclosure in the footnotes, to non-disclosure of fair values.  
Upon adoption of IAS 40, public firms in the EU ceased application of domestic accounting 
standards in their consolidated accounts, and instead were required to recognize or disclose the 
fair value of their investment property. 
The setting represents a rare opportunity to investigate the information asymmetry effects 
surrounding the voluntary and mandatory adoption of fair value information for firms whose 
primary operating asset is involved.
1  As the voluntary adoption of accounting standards arises 
                                                 
1   On average, investment property represents over 78% of our sample firms’ assets.    2
endogenously, we investigate if EU investment property firms voluntarily provide fair value 
information when the demand for such information is greatest.  We also investigate if the 
reporting of these fair values results in relatively lower information asymmetry, as indicated by 
firms’ bid-ask spreads.  In addition, we investigate if the mandatory adoption of fair value 
reporting under IFRS by firms not previously reporting fair values results in lower information 
asymmetry, or whether previously found differences in information asymmetry persist because 
of implementation and enforcement differences. 
Using a sample of continental-European investment property firms in the period prior to 
mandatory IFRS adoption, we find that firms not disclosing fair value information come from 
countries with weaker legal protection, weaker enforcement and higher corruption.
2  We then 
examine the determinants of firms’ choices to provide fair value information in the period prior 
to mandatory IFRS adoption, finding that firms with concentrated ownership are less likely to 
provide investment property fair values prior to IFRS.  This evidence is consistent with such 
firms enjoying relatively fewer benefits through the reporting of fair value information.  In 
addition, firms exhibiting other commitments to reporting transparency (such as membership in a 
lead industry group that endorses fair value reporting) are more likely to provide fair values prior 
to IFRS.   
Our last set of tests examines information asymmetry differences across firms providing 
and not providing fair value information.  In the period prior to IAS 40, we find that firms 
providing investment property fair values have relatively lower information asymmetry, as 
indicated by relatively lower bid-ask spreads.  This evidence is consistent with the provision of 
fair values for this asset reducing information asymmetry, and thus lowering firms’ cost of 
                                                 
2   Given the vast differences in the size and development of the UK property market and the sophistication of the 
UK appraisal profession relative to other EU countries, we focus our analysis on continental-European 
investment property firms.    3
capital.  During the time period surrounding the switch to the mandated IFRS regime, we fail to 
find evidence of reduced information asymmetry for firms previously not providing investment 
property fair values.  Rather, we find evidence that the shift to IAS 40 did not eliminate 
previously documented differences in information asymmetry, as firms which did not provide 
investment property fair values prior to IFRS continue to have higher bid-ask spreads in the post-
IFRS adoption period.  This is consistent with investors having concerns regarding the 
implementation of IAS 40 and the reported fair values even after IFRS is adopted. 
We note that our results may be subject to a number of limitations.  First, while the 
importance of fair value information in this industry appears of importance to market 
participants, the number of firms in our analyses is small given our focus on one industry.  In 
addition, given that we examine one type of long-lived tangible asset, our findings may not 
generalize to other fair value settings.  Finally, as we examine the year following the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, information differences observed in the post period may not persist in the 
long-term, especially as countries and firms improve their implementation and enforcement of 
accounting standards. 
  Our paper adds to the literature in several ways.  First, we contribute to the literature on 
accounting choice (e.g., Fields et al. 2001) by documenting determinants of firms’ decisions 
related to fair value reporting for their primary asset class.  Second, we build on the literature 
examining fair values (e.g., Easton et al. 1993) and the consequences of disclosure (e.g., Healy 
and Palepu 2001) by documenting that firms voluntarily providing fair values are perceived to 
have lower information asymmetry.  Finally, we contribute to the literature on the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS (e.g., Daske et al. 2007b) by documenting that required provision of fair values 
under mandated IFRS adoption is not sufficient to overcome prior informational differences    4
associated with non-disclosure of these values; rather, these informational differences persist, 
suggesting investors perceive differences in IFRS implementation.  Overall, our results may help 
standard-setters and practitioners understand the characteristics and circumstances affecting 
firms’ decisions involving fair value measures.  In addition, our results contribute both to the 
general debate on fair value accounting (e.g., Watts 2006), as well as the specific debate on 
converging U.S. standards with international standards, particularly within the real estate 
industry (NAREIT 2008), by revealing the occurrence, causes, and consequences of variation in 
firms’ reporting choices.
3 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides background 
information and hypothesis development.  Section 3 presents our sample selection and 
descriptive statistics.  Section 4 presents our research design and empirical results.  Section 5 
presents sensitivity analyses.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The European Investment Property Industry 
The investment property industry in Europe comprises approximately 180 publicly-traded 
firms, with an aggregate equity market value of over €150 billion at December 31, 2005.  While 
most European countries have publicly-traded investment property companies, the three largest 
economies (France, Germany, and the UK) are home to more than half of investment property 
firms.  Further, the UK has the largest number of firms, likely reflecting both the greater 
emphasis on equity markets in the UK relative to continental-European countries, as well as the 
                                                 
3   US real estate investment trusts (or REITs), which are analogous to the investment property firms we examine, 
currently are required to report using historical cost under US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), 
with few voluntarily disclosing fair values of real estate assets.  However, convergence activities between US and 
international standard setters indicate that the US requirement for historical cost will have to be merged with the 
international requirement to recognize or disclose investment property fair values (see Phase Two of the Fair 
Value Option project: FASB 2007, http://www.fasb.org/project/fv_option.shtml).    5
relatively advanced institutional features of the UK property market (e.g., Dietrich et al. 2001; 
Muller and Riedl 2002; Riedl 2005).  
The business model of our sample firms involves obtaining (either through purchase, 
lease, or development), managing, and selling real estate in order to generate profits through 
rentals and/or capital appreciation.  Typically, these firms either acquire legal ownership of the 
property through a purchase, or hold the property under a finance lease.  While a firm may invest 
in any country, the majority maintains holdings concentrated within the firm’s country of 
domicile.  Finally, many investment property firms voluntarily belong to the European Public 
Real Estate Association (EPRA), the lead industry group established to provide a forum for, 
among other things, best practices for financial reporting in the real estate industry. 
Accounting for Investment Property  
Domestic GAAP Prior to IFRS Adoption 
Prior to the adoption of IFRS in Europe in 2005, investment property assets were 
accounted for under the domestic accounting standards applied within the firm’s country of 
domicile.  The treatment varied considerably across the European countries that are the focus of 
this study (see Table 2), but broadly may be categorized into two models: cost and revaluation.  
The domestic standards of some countries (e.g., Italy) explicitly require that investment property 
be accounted for under the cost model.  Domestic standards in several other countries de facto 
require this treatment (e.g., France, Germany), as they do not separately address this particular 
tangible asset,
4 which is consequently treated under the cost model as are other tangible long-
lived assets:  they are depreciated over some estimate of the asset’s useful life, with depreciation 
                                                 
4   While France technically allowed revaluations of investment properties, such revaluations are taxable under the 
French tax code.  Consequently, no French firms (at least within our sample) chose to perform property 
revaluations, and industry practice was to apply the cost model.    6
expense reported on the income statement, and some requirement for impairment testing.  Of 
note, however, some firms using this reporting model voluntarily disclose property fair values. 
Domestic accounting standards in other countries, notably the UK, require that 
investment properties be accounted for using the revaluation model.  Under this model, these 
assets are presented on the balance sheet at fair value.
5  Changes in fair value do not, however, 
flow through the income statement; rather, these changes are recognized directly in equity (e.g., 
in an account such as “revaluation reserve”).  No depreciation is reported.  Finally, the domestic 
accounting standards for several countries (e.g., Belgium, Netherlands) allow firms the flexibility 
to choose either the cost or revaluation model.  None of our sample countries have domestic 
accounting standards allowing or requiring the fair value model (under which fair value changes 
flow through income) for this asset class.  
In all countries, investment properties fall under the purview of auditor examination, 
whether reported under the cost or revaluation model.  However, those countries requiring the 
revaluation model also tend to have a more developed institutional structure incorporating 
additional external monitoring of provided fair values.  This role is performed by appraisers, 
either external (that is, independent appraisal firms hired by the investment property firm) or 
internal (that is, qualified individuals within the investment property firm).  The UK is 
noteworthy, wherein domestic standards require that property fair values be reviewed by an 
external appraiser at least once every five years, and use of external appraisers is common.
6     
 
                                                 
5   Under the applicable UK standard (Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 19, Accounting for Investment 
Properties), real estate assets are reported at “open market value.”  This is defined similarly to “fair value” under 
IAS 40.  Both focus on prices obtained in a market setting with informed buyers – that is, an “exit price” notion.  
6   In the U.K., the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors has established specific guidelines on the process of 
property valuation.  Other countries, particularly those wherein the domestic GAAP require the revaluation 
model, rely on standards promulgated by the International Valuation Standards Committee.    7
IFRS and IAS 40 
  In June 2002 the Council of Ministers of the EU approved the so-called “IAS 
Regulation,” which required publicly-traded companies on European regulated markets to use 
IFRS as the basis for presenting their consolidated financial statements for fiscal years beginning 
on or after January 1, 2005.
7  Within the investment property industry, one of the primary effects 
relates to the application of IAS 40 – Investment Property, which defines investment property as  
property (land or a building – or part of a building – or both) held (by the owner or by the 
lessee under a finance lease) to earn rentals or for capital appreciation or both, rather than 
for: (a) use in the production or supply of goods or services or for administrative 
purposes; or (b) sale in the ordinary course of business. (IAS 40.5)   
Subsequent to initial recognition at cost, IAS 40.30 requires firms to choose between the cost and 
fair value models and apply the chosen policy to all of their investment property.
8 
Under the cost model, firms apply the requirements of IAS 16 – Property, Plant and 
Equipment (IAS 40.56) pertaining to this method, with investment property carried at its cost less 
any accumulated depreciation and impairment losses (IAS 16.30).  Notably, however, IAS 40 
still requires these firms to disclose fair value in the footnotes, except where, under exceptional 
circumstances, fair value cannot be determined reliably (IAS 40.79 (e)).   
Under the fair value model, investment property is carried on the balance sheet at fair 
value (IAS 40.33), with all changes in fair value recognized in the income statement (IAS 40.35).  
Fair value is determined under a fair value hierarchy described in IAS 40.45-47, where the best 
evidence of fair value is given by current prices in an active market for similar property in the 
same location and condition and subject to similar lease and other contracts.  Firms are 
                                                 
7   See Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 19, 2002.  Firms with 
a December 31 fiscal-year end must apply IFRS for fiscal years ending December 31, 2005.  Firms with non-
December 31 year-ends must apply IFRS for fiscal years ending in 2006 (e.g., for a March 31 fiscal-year end, for 
financial statements ending March 31, 2006). 
8   IAS 40 allows two exceptions, both quite restrictive, by which firms may report part of their property portfolio 
under the cost model, and part under the fair value model.  However, as a practical matter most firms, including 
all within our sample, apply either the cost or fair value models to their full portfolio of investment properties.      8
encouraged, but not required, to enlist independent valuers (i.e., appraisers) with relevant 
qualification and experience when determining investment property fair values (IAS 40.32).   
IAS 40 is significant as it marks the first time the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) introduced a fair value accounting model for non-financial assets.  Further, all 
firms must provide fair values for their real estate assets – either directly on the balance sheet 
under the fair value model or within the footnotes under the cost model.  However, since only the 
fair value model results in unrealized fair value gains or losses flowing through income, the 
choice between the two models affects reported income and net asset value volatility.  
Interestingly, IAS 40 allows firms to switch from the cost to the fair value model to achieve 
fairer presentation, but effectively prohibits switching from the fair value to the cost model (IAS 
40.31).  Finally, it is noteworthy that EPRA’s best practice policy recommendations recommend 
that firms reporting under IAS 40 use the fair value model (EPRA 2006). 
Related Literature 
This paper builds on four primary streams of literature.  First, we build on the prior 
international research examining the implementation of accounting standards.  Several papers 
provide evidence that substantial reporting differences remain after convergence efforts that 
preceded the mandated 2005 adoption of IFRS within the EU (e.g., Tay and Parker 1990; Joos 
and Lang 1994).  Recent papers also provide evidence of potential (e.g., Ball 1995, 2006; 
Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski 2006; Sellhorn and Gornik-Tomaszewski 2006), actual 
(e.g., Ball et al. 2003; Beuselinck et al. 2007; Zeff 2007), and perceived (e.g., Daske et al. 2007a) 
variation in IFRS implementation.   
Second, we build on the literature examining attributes of fair value estimates for non-
financial assets.  Easton et al. (1993) and Barth and Clinch (1998) both find that voluntary    9
tangible asset revaluations for Australian firms are associated with equity prices reflecting 
sufficient reliability for incorporation into share prices.  Other papers document concerns over 
fair value estimates.  Danbolt and Rees (2008) provides evidence that fair values are biased 
where valuation is ambiguous (tangible assets) and are more reliable where they are 
unambiguous (financial assets).  Ramanna and Watts (2007) provides evidence that the 
unverifiable nature of goodwill impairments, which are based on fair value estimation, gives 
firms discretion to manage impairments.  In addition, two studies are particularly germane to the 
current paper, as both focus on the UK real estate industry.  Dietrich et al. (2001) provides 
evidence that fair value estimates by UK property firms employing external appraisers are less 
biased and more accurate than those reported by firms employing internal appraisers.  Muller and 
Riedl (2002) extends these findings, providing evidence that the market perceives these fair 
value estimates as more reliable when external as opposed to internal appraisers are employed, 
reflected in lower bid-ask spreads for firms employing external appraisers.   
Third, we build on the literature examining the determinants of firms’ choice of 
accounting policies (see Fields et al. 2001 for a review), some of which have focused on the 
decision to voluntarily report fair values of non-financial assets.  Muller (1999) examines UK 
firms’ voluntary decision to capitalize current value estimates of brand names acquired in a 
business combination, providing evidence that this decision reflects attempts to minimize the 
cost of obtaining shareholder approval for future acquisitions or disposals.  Lemke and Page 
(1992) investigates UK firms’ compliance with a domestic standard requiring firms to 
supplement the historical-cost based income statements and balance sheets with current cost-
based ones, concluding that the major motivation for compliance was the ability to report lower 
income.      10
Finally, our study contributes evidence to the literature on the consequences of 
disclosure.  Using a sample of German firms, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) shows that firms 
committing to increased disclosure by voluntarily adopting IFRS or US GAAP experience lower 
information asymmetry than firms reporting under domestic GAAP.  Daske et al. (2007b) partly 
corroborates this effect for a large, international sample of firms subject to mandatory IFRS 
adoption, which was intended to enhance firms’ disclosure environments. 
Hypotheses Development 
As discussed above, domestic reporting standards and practices for real estate assets 
varied considerably among our sample firms prior to mandatory IFRS adoption and 
implementation of IAS 40, with some firms providing investment property fair values, and some 
firms not providing this information.  Because accounting practices arise endogenously as 
efficient responses to the demand for accounting information (Ball et al. 2000), we hypothesize 
that firms will provide these fair values where demand for this information is greatest, reflected 
in characteristics such as the ownership structure of the firm.  We also expect that firms 
providing fair value information are more likely to have exercised other reporting choices in a 
way consistent with a commitment to increased financial reporting transparency.  This leads to 
the following hypothesis on the cause of firms providing investment property fair values (all 
hypotheses stated in alternative form): 
H1:    European real estate firms providing investment property fair values exhibit 
characteristics reflecting greater demand for this information as well as a 
commitment to increased financial reporting transparency.   
 
We also examine financial statement users’ perception of investment property fair values.  
Investors may perceive these fair values as informative, as they provide timely information 
reflecting current values of the firm’s primary assets (EPRA 2006).  However, investors may    11
perceive reported fair values as uninformative, due to measurement error (e.g., arising from 
varying levels of liquidity within local property markets, or diverse accounting standards for 
these estimates) and/or bias (e.g., arising from managers’ incentives to distort these estimates, 
and variation in the monitoring to reduce such distortions).  This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2:    European real estate firms not voluntarily disclosing or recognizing investment 
property fair values have greater information asymmetry. 
 
The adoption of IFRS was broadly intended to mitigate differences in information quality 
across firms, thus facilitating improved comparisons and flows of capital (e.g., Armstrong et al. 
2008).  Within the real estate industry, investment properties are the primary asset, suggesting 
adoption of IAS 40 should play a critical role in “leveling the playing field” by requiring 
provision of previously unknown fair values of these core assets for a subset of firms.  This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H3A:    European real estate firms not previously disclosing or recognizing investment 
property fair values experience decreased information asymmetry following 
adoption of IAS 40. 
However, prior research suggests that adoption is not sufficient for either improving 
information quality or achieving comparable information across firms.  Variation in 
implementation, both at the country and firm level, can result in continuing variation in 
information quality (e.g., Ball 1995, 2006; Ball et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Daske et al. 
2007a, 2007b).  In the current setting, variations in the liquidity and institutional structure of 
local property markets, and in the discretion firms apply in implementing IAS 40, can lead to 
differences in the quality of provided investment property fair values.  In this case, investors can 
view adoption of IAS 40 as insufficient to eliminate previous information quality differences, if 
they perceive implementation is not uniform even under a commonly applied reporting standard.  
This leads to the final hypothesis, related to H3A above:    12
H3B:    European real estate firms not previously disclosing or recognizing investment 
property fair values have higher information asymmetry even after adoption of 
IAS 40 requiring the provision of this information.   
 
III.  SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 presents the sample selection.  From active firms as of December 15, 2006, we 
exclude firms having various conditions (e.g., not reporting under IFRS, being subsidiaries, or 
having less than ten percent of total assets as investment property) and lacking certain data (e.g., 
the cost versus fair value model decision under IAS 40, or variables used in our equations), 
leading to a final sample of 77 firms.  We focus on continental-European investment property 
firms due the UK investment property being substantially larger and more developed (e.g., the 
UK property market value was estimated by Investment Property Databank to be €241 billion at 
the end of 2005, versus €327 billion for the other EU countries combined), as well as the greater 
sophistication of the UK appraisal profession (e.g., the UK Royal Institute of Chartered 
Surveyors is the only such country-specific actuarial association within the EU).
9  
Panel A of Table 2 provides a breakdown of our sample by country, revealing that France 
and Germany have the highest representation, with 34 percent of the total sample.  The table also 
presents firms’ provision of investment property fair values in the pre-IFRS period, with 18 (59) 
not providing (providing) this information.  Finally, the table presents the IAS 40 model choice, 
with 19 (58) sample firms choosing the cost model with required footnote disclosure of fair 
values (fair value model).  Closer examination indicates that both the provision of fair values in 
                                                 
9   We also focus on continental-European firms due differences in market microstructures.  UK investment 
property firms’ trades are typically processed by market makers; whereas continental-European investment 
property firms’ trades are handled on an order-driven basis.  Prior research indicates that quoted spreads in dealer 
markets are typically higher than in order-driven markets (see Pagano 1998 for a review).  In untabulated 
analysis, we reestimated our spread analyses including UK investment property firms, and allowing a separate 
dummy variable for UK investment property firms.  Consistent with prior research investigating dealer markets 
relative to order-driven markets, we found that the dummy variable was significantly positive.  In addition, our 
inferences (reported later) remained unchanged to this alternative specification, except that the dummy variable 
NO_FV_PRE in Table 5 was significant at a slightly lower level (one-sided p-value = 0.07).      13
pre-IFRS reporting, as well as selection of the fair value model under IAS 40, occur 
predominantly within several Scandinavian countries, with continental-European countries 
(particularly France and Germany) exhibiting substantial variation.   
Panel B of Table 2 provides a more detailed examination of firm-specific and country 
characteristics across the firms providing and not providing fair value information.  The table 
presents little evidence of firm specific differences.  Firms providing and not providing fair value 
information have similar amounts of total assets being comprised of investment property and 
similar use of Big 4 auditors and external appraisers (all assessed in the mandatory IFRS 
adoption year).  However, the table provides evidence of significant country differences.  Firms 
not providing fair value information tend to be domiciled in countries with less efficient judicial 
systems, less tradition for law and order, and higher levels of corruption. 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
  In this section, we provide the results of our empirical tests.  In the first analysis, we 
examine the causes of European real estate firms’ decisions to provide versus not provide 
investment property fair values prior to IAS 40.  We then investigate whether this decision leads 
to greater information asymmetry among market participants.  Finally, we examine whether the 
mandatory adoption of IAS 40 resulted in a reduction in information asymmetry, consistent with 
IAS 40 leveling the informational playing field. 
Causes of Providing versus Not Providing Investment Property Fair Values Prior to IFRS  
We begin by exploring the causes of European real estate firms’ decisions to provide 
versus not provide investment property fair values prior to IFRS and IAS 40.
10  We argue that the 
                                                 
10  We acknowledge that this may not be a strictly firm level decision, as there appear to be some country level 
reporting requirements and/or norms in the disclosure of investment property fair values (e.g., see Table 2).     14
demand for this information and the firm’s commitment to transparency are the main drivers of 
this choice.
11  Thus, we estimate the following logistic regression model: 
FV_PREi =  α0 + α1LIQ_COUNTRY + α2CLOSEHELDi + α3VOL_ADOPTi  
 +  α4EPRAi + α5SIZEi + α6DEBT_MCAPi + α7CFO_MCAPi + ε i   (1)  
 
The dependent variable, FV_PRE, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i provides investment 
property fair values in the financial statements or annual report of the year preceding mandatory 
IFRS adoption, and 0 otherwise.  The experimental variables are: LIQ_COUNTRY, the 
percentage turnover of investment property for the entire property market of firm i’s country of 
domicile;
12 CLOSEHELD, the percentage of firm i’s stock held by insiders; VOL_ADOPT, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i voluntarily adopts IFRS prior to mandatory adoption, and 0 
otherwise; and EPRA, an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a member of EPRA at the end 
of 2004, and 0 otherwise.  We include LIQ_COUNTRY to capture a country-level measure of 
investment property market liquidity.  If higher liquidity reflects a countries’ propensity to 
mandate or allow fair value accounting for investment property, the predicted sign on α1 is 
positive.  However, if low liquidity enables managers to opportunistically report key 
performance measures, such as these fair values, then the predicted sign on α1 is negative.  We 
include CLOSEHELD to reflect the perceived demand for fair value information in the financial 
statements.  If insiders obtain information (such as fair values of the firm’s investment 
properties) through non-financial statement channels, management’s incentives to provide this 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nonetheless, our intent is to capture characteristics likely to result in either firm or country level provision of 
these fair values; thus, we attempt to capture both firm and country level determinants within the regression.  
11  Among other firm characteristics, we also examine whether property portfolios (i.e, commercial, retail, industrial, 
or other) differ across this choice.  No significant differences are observed. 
12  This is measured using turnover from the Investment Property Databank, which compiles property transactions 
and values from member firms, and is generally considered among the most comprehensive sources of property 
data for Europe.  Firms voluntarily join and supply this information; the primary benefit is to obtain detailed 
assessments of various property market conditions.      15
information through public disclosure is reduced (e.g., Ball et al. 2000); thus, we predict a 
negative sign for α2.  We include VOL_ADOPT and EPRA because we assume that voluntary 
adoption of IFRS and EPRA membership signal, among other things, commitments to 
transparency (e.g., Daske et al. 2007a).  Thus, we predict α3 and α4 to be positive.  We use α2, α3 
and α4 to test H1.   
Finally, we include three control variables.  First, we include SIZE, measured as the log 
of firm i’s market capitalization, to control for the effects of the information environment 
(among other factors) on this reporting decision.  We also include DEBT_MCAP, measured as 
firm i’s total debt divided by market capitalization, to control for the effects of leverage.  Finally, 
we include CFO_MCAP, firm i’s reported cash flow from operations divided by market 
capitalization, to control for the firm’s performance.
13  All three variables are measured at the 
end of the fiscal year preceding mandatory IFRS adoption.  Because the predicted effects of 
these variables are unclear, we do not predict the signs on α5, α6, or α7. 
Table 3 presents univariate and multivariate results related to the estimation of Eq. (1).  
The univariate tests reported in Panel A reveal that “Fair Value” firms (i.e., those providing this 
information) have significantly less investment property market liquidity (mean of 8.3% 
compared to “No Fair Value” firms’ 9.5%), a significantly lower proportion of closely held 
shares (mean of 40.0% compared to “No Fair Value” firms’ 66.0%), and are significantly more 
likely to be EPRA members (mean of 47.5% compared to “No Fair Value” firms’ 11.1%).  
Differences across the remaining variables are insignificant.   
The logistic regression results are presented in Panel B, and corroborate the univariate 
findings—with the exception of the LIQ_COUNTRY variable.  Specifically, we observe that 
                                                 
13  Alternative scalars, such as sales or total reported assets, do not change our inferences.    16
firms are more likely to provide investment property fair values when ownership is dispersed 
(CLOSEHELD coefficient = –3.640, Wald statistic = 5.18) and if they reveal a commitment to 
transparent reporting (EPRA coefficient = 1.613, Wald statistic = 2.33).  LIQ_COUNTRY is 
insignificant, as are the control variables.  Overall, these results provide support for H1 that firms 
providing investment property fair values prior to mandatory IFRS adoption exhibit 
characteristics reflecting greater demand for this information as well as a greater commitment to 
financial reporting transparency. 
Consequences of Providing versus Not Providing Investment Property Fair Values Prior to 
IFRS 
We now explore the consequences of European real estate firms’ decisions to provide 
versus not provide investment property fair values under pre-IFRS domestic accounting 
standards—specifically, if the omission leads to relatively higher bid-ask spreads.
14  We examine 
this possibility through the following regression model: 
 LogBID_ASKPRE,i =  β0 + β1LogPRICEPRE,i + β2LogVOLUMEPRE,i + β3LogSTD_RETPRE,i  
    +   β4LogFFPRE,i + β5LogANALYSTPRE,i  
    +   β6IMRPRE,i + β7NO_FV_PREi + θi   (2)  
The dependent variable, LogBID_ASK, is the log of firm i’s mean daily percentage bid-ask 
spread measured over the pre-IFRS period (denoted by the “PRE” suffix).  The pre-IFRS period 
is measured as the one-month period beginning three months following the fiscal year end of the 
year preceding mandatory IFRS adoption (see Figure 1).
15  Corresponding to our setting prior to 
                                                 
14  We focus only on bid-ask spreads, due to their more precise development in terms of both theoretical 
determinants and ability to isolate the component attributable to information asymmetry (which is the focus of 
our analysis).  Other measures, such as turnover and trading volume, do not permit unambiguous inferences. 
15  We begin the measurement period three months following the fiscal year end to coincide with the required 
release of annual reports within our sample countries.  We assess the bid-ask spread over a one-month window to 
allow a sufficient but focused measurement period.  Alternative window lengths (e.g., three-month or six-month) 
and starting points (e.g., four or six months after fiscal year end) do not change our inferences.    17
IFRS adoption, all variables in this specification are measured over the pre-IFRS or at the end of 
the fiscal year preceding mandatory IFRS adoption.  Further, we adopt the log-linear form for the 
dependent and control variables to accommodate the multiplicative relationships proposed by 
theoretical research on the determinants of bid-ask spreads (e.g., Stoll 1978).   
We then include several variables to control for other determinants of our information 
asymmetry proxy, the bid-ask spread (e.g., Lee et al. 1993; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). We 
include LogPRICEPRE, the log of firm i’s closing share price, to control for market-makers’ order 
processing costs, which become proportionately smaller for higher priced stocks; the predicted 
sign for β1 is negative.  We include LogVOLUMEPRE, the log of firm i's trading volume 
(expressed in thousands of Euros) and LogSTD_RETPRE, the log of firm i's standard deviation of 
stock returns, to control for market-makers’ inventory holding costs, with predicted signs of 
negative for β2 and positive for β3.  We include LogFFPRE, the log of firm i’s percentage of free 
float shares, measured at the end of the pre-IFRS period, to control for differences in the 
availability of tradeable shares.  If information asymmetry among market participants is lower in 
firms with a higher proportion of tradeable shares, we predict β4 to be negative.  Finally, we 
include LogANALYSTPRE, the log of firm i's analyst following (calculated as the log of one plus 
the number of analysts covering the firm), to control for the firms’ information environment.  As 
greater analyst following should reduce information asymmetries, we predict a negative sign for 
β5.  We also include the inverse Mills ratio (IMRPRE), computed from the first-stage logistic 
regression Eq. (1), to control for any self-selection bias.  This enables us to capture the marginal 
effect of our experimental variable on our information asymmetry proxy, given other 
determinants of information asymmetry.    18
Our primary experimental variable is NO_FV_PRE, measured as an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if firm i provides no fair value information in the pre-IFRS period, and 0 otherwise.  If 
investors perceive fair values as useful, non-provision should increase information asymmetry 
and reduce the informational efficiency of share prices; hence, β7 is predicted positive and used 
to test H2.
16   
Table 4 presents univariate and multivariate results related to the estimation of Eq. (2).  
Panel A presents univariate results comparing bid-ask spreads across the “No Fair Value” (N = 
18) and “Fair Value” (N = 59) groups.  Results are consistent with expectations, with “No Fair 
Value” firms having significantly higher bid-ask spreads (BID_ASK mean difference = 2.231, p-
value = 0.011).   
Panel B presents the multivariate results.  In the first column, the control variables 
volume (LogVOLUMEPRE) and analyst following (LogANALYSTPRE) are significant in the 
predicted direction; however, the variables price (LogPRICEPRE), risk (LogSTD_RETPRE), free 
float (LogFFPRE), the inverse Mills ratio (IMRPRE) are insignificant.  In the second column, the 
coefficient on NO_PRE_FV is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.443, t-statistic = 2.00), 
when the inverse Mills ratio is included.  The coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is 
insignificant, again indicating that self-selection does not appear problematic; significance for 
the other control variables remains unchanged.  In the third column, the coefficient on 
NO_PRE_FV is again positive and significant (coefficient = 0.474, t-statistic = 2.23), when the 
inverse Mills ratio is excluded (e.g., Francis and Lennox 2008).  Thus, our results are consistent 
                                                 
16  To control for potential differences in market microstructure across our sample countries that may be correlated 
with our experimental variable (NO_FV_PRE), we examine several alternative specifications of Eq. (1).  First, 
we add an indicator variable that equals one for Scandinavian countries (that is, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden), as these countries appear more likely to disclose investment property fair values under domestic 
reporting standards.  Results are slightly stronger than those reported.  Second, we include an indicator variable 
that equals one for countries in which all firms provide investment property fair values prior to IFRS (that is, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland).  Results are unchanged from those 
reported.        19
with investors perceiving that the omission of fair values leads to higher information asymmetry, 
and provides support for H2.  In the next section, we examine whether the requirement of IAS 40 
to provide (i.e., recognize or disclose) fair value information led to these differences in 
information asymmetry across European real estate firms being mitigated. 
Does Required Provision of Investment Property Fair Values Under IAS 40 Eliminate 
Perceived Differences Across Firms? 
We assess whether mandated fair value reporting under IAS 40 has ‘leveled the playing 
field’ in terms of information asymmetry between firms that provide versus those that do not 
provide investment property fair values in the pre-IFRS period, or whether differences between 
the two groups remain, using the following regression model, which parallels Eq. (2): 
 LogBID_ASKPOST,i =  δ0 + δ1LogPRICEPOST,i + δ2LogVOLUMEPOST,i + δ3LogSTD_RETPOST,i  
    +   δ4LogFFPOST,i + δ5LogANALYSTPOST,i + δ6NO_FV_PREi + τi   (3)  
The dependent variable, LogBID_ASKPOST, is now measured over the post-IFRS period to assess 
whether information asymmetry continues to differ between the fair-value and no-fair value 
groups.  The post-IFRS period is measured as the one-month period beginning three months after 
the fiscal year end of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Paralleling the measurement of our dependent 
variable, all variables in Eq. (3) are measured either over the post-IFRS period, or as of the end 
of the mandatory IFRS adoption fiscal year.  The control variables and associated predictions in 
Eq. (3) mirror those discussed for Eq. (2).  We do not include the inverse Mills ratio for the post 
IAS 40 analysis, as the firms can no longer choose to not disclose fair value information. 
Our experimental variable remains NO_FV_PRE, an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i 
does not provide investment property fair value in the pre-IFRS period, and 0 otherwise.  If IAS 
40 is unable to eliminate the source of information asymmetry between the two groups (e.g., due 
to investors concerns over implementation or estimation), the coefficient for NO_FV_PRE (δ6)    20
will be positive.  Alternatively, if IAS 40 reduces or eliminates this information asymmetry 
through its required provision of fair value estimates, then δ6 should be insignificant.   
  Table 5 presents univariate and multivariate results related to the estimation of Eq. (3).  
Panel A presents univariate comparisons across the two groups, which indicate that information 
asymmetry differences, while somewhat reduced, largely remain, as the “No Fair Value” firms 
continue to have higher bid-ask spreads (mean difference = 1.480; p-value = 0.021) than the 
“Fair Value” firms.  
Panel B presents the multivariate results.  In the first column the control variables volume 
(LogVOLUMEPOST) and analyst following (LogANALYSTPOST) are significant in the predicted 
direction; however, the variables price (LogPRICEPOST), risk (LogSTD_RETPOST), and 
concentrated ownership (LogFFPOST) are insignificant.  In the second column, the coefficient on 
NO_FV_PRE is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.362, t-statistic = 1.66).   
  We more formally test for changes in information asymmetry from the pre-IFRS to the 
post-IFRS periods in Table 6.  Panel A presents univariate results, comparing the “No Fair 
Value” and “Fair Value” groups for changes in information asymmetry.  Consistent with our 
earlier findings, we fail to find evidence that the relative information asymmetry changed with 
the implementation of IAS 40.  Specifically, while Panel A documents a marginally significant 
decrease in the bid-ask-spread both for firms providing and not providing investment property 
fair values prior to mandatory IFRS adoption, the differences across these two groups are 
insignificant.  Panel B presents tests of equality of coefficients across Eqs. (2) and (3)—i.e., 
whether the coefficients differ in the post versus pre periods.  Again, consistent with our earlier 
findings, we fail to find evidence of a change in information asymmetry for the firms not    21
previously disclosing fair value information (coefficient for NO_FV_PREPOST – NO_FV_PREPRE 
= –0.112; t-statistic = –0.36).   
In summary, we find evidence that the move to mandated fair value disclosure under IAS 
40 does not fully eliminate previously documented differences in information asymmetry across 
the “No Fair Value” and “Fair Value” groups.  Rather, differences in information asymmetry 
remain, providing support for H3B.  We fail to find evidence that required provision of fair values 
under mandatory IFRS adoption reduces information asymmetry for those firms that did not 
previously provide fair values, and thus fail to support H3A.  This evidence is consistent with 
market participants perceiving heterogeneity in the quality of fair value disclosures, even when 
these amounts are required under a uniform standard (i.e., IAS 40). 
 
V.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS –  
DISCLOSURE VERSUS RECOGNITION UNDER IAS 40 
  We also examine the causes and consequences of disclosing investment property fair 
values (as occurs for firms choosing the cost model under IAS 40) versus recognizing them (as 
occurs for firms choosing the fair value model under IAS 40).  This provides some insights into 
whether continuing differences in information asymmetry arise primarily due to the disclosure 
versus recognition choice afforded under IAS 40. 
Descriptive statistics reveal that 19 (58) of our sample firms choose the cost model (fair 
value model) under IAS 40.
17  We then estimate a logistic regression similar to Eq. (1), with the 
dependent variable now the decision to adopt the fair value model (i.e., recognition of fair 
values) versus cost model (i.e., disclosure of fair values) under IAS 40.  Untabulated results 
                                                 
17  The mapping of firms occurs as follows.  Of the 18 firms not providing fair values in the pre-IFRS period, 13 (5) 
choose the cost model (fair value model).  Of the 59 firms providing fair values in the pre-IFRS period, 6 (53) 
choose the cost model (fair value model).      22
reveal that similar determinants of the decision to provide investment property fair values in the 
pre-IFRS period (see Table 3) also affect the decision to adopt the fair value model under IAS 
40.  To maintain consistency with our dependent variable, we measure these determinants during 
the IFRS adoption year, versus the year prior to adoption in the Table 3 analysis.  We find that 
the demand for fair value information also affects this decision, as firms with more dispersed 
ownership are significantly more likely (p-value = 0.004) to choose the fair value model.  We 
also find that firms choosing the fair value model are significantly more likely to have 
membership in EPRA (p-value = 0.091), consistent with exhibiting a greater commitment to 
reporting transparency.   
We then examine whether investors perceive differences in the recognition versus 
disclosure of investment property fair values.  Untabulated univariate differences in bid-ask 
spreads are consistent with investors perceiving that firms disclosing these fair values have 
similar information asymmetry as firms recognizing these fair values; differences across these 
groupings are insignificant (p-value = 0.753).  In addition, multivariate analyses examining bid-
ask spreads, similar in form to Eq. (3), also fail to provide evidence that investors perceive 
differences across these groupings.  Thus, we fail to find evidence that continuing differences in 
perceived information asymmetry under IAS 40 (e.g., Table 5) are strictly attributable to the 
disclosure versus recognition of investment property fair values under this standard. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This paper examines the causes and consequences of different forms of fair value 
disclosures for tangible long-lived assets.  For our sample firms, which operate in the real estate 
industry, the primary asset is investment property, suggesting the reporting for this asset is a    23
first-order reporting choice.  We exploit the setting of IFRS adoption within the EU.  Under 
domestic reporting standards prior to IFRS, some firms provide investment property fair values 
(either through balance sheet recognition under the revaluation model, or through footnote 
disclosure), while some do not provide this information.  However, upon adoption of IFRS and 
application of the relevant standard, IAS 40 – Investment Property, all firms must provide these 
fair values either through recognition in the primary financial statements (under the fair value 
model option) or through required footnote disclosure (under the cost model option).   
Regarding causes, we examine European real estate firms’ choices to provide versus not 
provide investment property fair values prior to IFRS.  We provide evidence that the decision 
reflects the demand for these fair values and other signals from the firm of commitment to 
reporting transparency.  Specifically, we find that firms with more dispersed ownership are more 
likely to provide fair values prior to IFRS, consistent with firms that have concentrated 
ownership relying less on reporting fair values through the financial statements to mitigate 
information asymmetry.  In addition, firms exhibiting other commitments to reporting 
transparency (such as membership in a lead industry group advocating best reporting practice – 
see Baik et al. 2008) are more likely to provide fair values prior to IFRS.  
Regarding consequences, we use the pre-IFRS period to examine the import of providing 
versus not providing investment property fair values.  We report evidence that firms providing 
investment property fair values have lower information asymmetry than those not providing 
these fair values, reflected in lower bid-ask spreads.  This is consistent with the provision of fair 
values for this asset lowering information asymmetry, and thus firm’s cost of capital.  We then 
examine whether the adoption of IFRS reduces or eliminates these previously documented 
differences in information asymmetry, owing to the now mandatory provision of investment    24
property fair values under IAS 40.  Empirical results reveal that IAS 40 does not fully eliminate 
previously documented differences in information asymmetry.  Rather, we find evidence that 
firms, which did not provide investment property fair values prior to IFRS, continue to have 
higher bid-ask spreads even after mandatory adoption of IFRS.   
While we cannot fully identify why these information asymmetry differences remain, 
several observations are relevant.  First, it is possible that some cause unrelated to the provision 
of investment property fair values leads to observed differences in information asymmetry across 
those firms providing versus not providing these fair value estimates – both before and after 
adoption of IFRS.  However, given that investment properties represent over three-quarters of 
total assets for these firms, it is unclear what a larger source of information asymmetry would be.  
Second, that IFRS does not eliminate these differences is consistent with investors’ perceiving 
differences in the quality of fair values provided, even under a uniform standard.  This could 
reflect concerns over implementation of IAS 40 at the firm level (e.g., managers have substantial 
discretion in the derivation of these fair value estimates), the industry level (e.g., the appraisal 
institutional structure is not uniformly developed at the time of IFRS adoption), or country level 
(e.g., owing to observed differences in judicial systems, corruption, etc.).  While we cannot 
isolate the cause of the perceived difference, these appear likely candidates.
18   
Overall, we contribute to the literatures on accounting for non-financial assets and 
consequences of disclosure by documenting that investors perceive investment property fair 
values to be reliable enough to warrant significantly lower cost of capital for those firms 
providing them.  We contribute to the literature on accounting choice by documenting that the 
                                                 
18  We also note that while strong institutions can lead to a supply of “high quality” reporting standards, alternatively 
“better” reporting standards can lead to both the demand for and evolution of stronger institutions to ensure high 
quality implementation of these standards.  Whether the latter occurs can be re-examined as IFRS and IAS 40 
continue to be applied within this industry over the coming years.     25
demand for fair value information (reflected in a firm’s ownership structure) and the firm’s 
commitment to reporting transparency is associated with the decision to provide fair values.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on international differences in the implementation of 
accounting standards by documenting variation in how property firms across EU countries 
implement a standard on fair values, and by providing evidence that adoption of this standard 
under IFRS, in and of itself, is insufficient to fully overcome previous perceived reporting 
differences across these firms.   
These insights may assist standard setters and users in understanding the factors 
influencing firms’ current and future accounting choices, and that allowing flexibility in these 
financial reporting decisions may result in systematically divergent choices by firms.  These 
insights are likely also of interest to US standard setters and managers of the almost 250 publicly 
traded US real estate firms (with a market capitalization of over $300 billion at December 31, 
2007), which must consider how the required historical cost basis applied under US GAAP (and 
general non-disclosure of investment property fair values in the US) will be converged with the 
IFRS requirement to recognize or disclose these fair values in the near future (NAREIT 2008).    26
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FIGURE 1 
Definition of Pre-IFRS and Post-IFRS Periods 
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This figure illustrates the windows used to calculate the bid-ask spreads used in our analyses.  We employ bid-ask spreads for two periods: “Pre-IFRS Period,” 
and “Post-IFRS Period.”  The “Pre-IFRS” period is defined as the one-month period starting three months after the end of the fiscal year preceding mandatory 
IFRS adoption.  The “Post-IFRS” period is defined as the one month period starting three months after the end of the fiscal year of mandatory IFRS adoption. 




 Less  Remaining
Firms traded on European Economic Area (EEA) stock exchanges that are 
classified as real estate firms in Thomson Financial Worldscope and active 
as of December 15, 2006 
 417 
Less firms:      
   not reporting under IFRS in “IFRS year” (2005 or 2005/2006)  –160  257 
   not operating in the investment property business  –55  202 
   that are subsidiaries   –9  193 
   for which no annual reports were found  –4  189 
   for which the cost versus fair value model decision for the “IFRS year”  
        (2005 or 2005/2006) could not be obtained  –3 186 
   for which the fair value of investment property in the “IFRS year”  
        (2005 or 2005/2006) could not be obtained  –8 178 
   for which the fair value of investment property in the “IFRS year”  
        (2005 or 2005/2006) is less than 10% of total assets     –21 157 
   for which data necessary to estimate causes or consequences analyses is   
        unavailable   –50 107 
   domiciled in the UK  –30  77 
Final Sample    77 
    
This table presents the sample selection process.  We begin with all publicly-traded real estate firms within the 
European Economic Area, active as of December 15, 2006.  We exclude firms that do not report under IFRS in 2005 
or 2006; that are not within the investment property business; that are subsidiaries; for which annual reports are 
unavailable; for which the choice of cost or fair value models could not be determined; for which the fair value of 
investment property (a required disclosure per IAS 40 under either model choice) could not be obtained; for which 
the fair value of investment properties reported in the IFRS year is less than 10% of total assets; and for which data 
necessary to estimate our multivariate analyses is unavailable.  We also exclude firms domiciled in the UK due to 
the substantially larger property market and more developed institutional features within this country, leading to our 
final sample (N = 77). 
 




Panel A.  Distribution by Country  
 
     Pre-IFRS 
Reporting    Model choice 
under IAS 40    Pre-IFRS domestic GAAP treatment of investment property: 





PP&E  Notes 
                  
Austria  6   2 4  1 5   X   X   
Belgium  8    0  8   0 8   X  X  X  Revaluations are allowed under 
certain circumstances. 
Denmark  3    0  3   0 3     X    Revaluation is required if investment 
property is the firm’s main activity. 
Finland  4   0 4  0 4   X      
France  14    7  7   8 6   X    X  Revaluation is permitted, but rare in 
practice, as surpluses are taxed. 
Germany  12   5 7  5 7   X   X   
Italy  3    1  2   2 1   X      While depreciation is not mandatory; 
fair value is prohibited. 
Netherlands  7    0  7   1 6   X  X    Disclosure of fair value is required. 
Norway  2   2 0  0 2   X   X   
Poland  1   0 1  0 1   X X  X  
Spain  3   1 2  2 1   X   X   
Sweden  9    0  9   0 9   X  X    Disclosure of fair value is required. 
Switzerland  5   0 5  0 5   X  X  X   
Total  77   18 59  19 58          
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Panel B.  Comparison of Firm and Country Characteristics 
 
Variable 
No Fair Value  
(N = 18) 
Fair Value  





IP_TA  0.721 0.794  –0.073  –1.04 
Big4  0.556 0.712  0.156  1.24 
Ext  0.813 0.860  0.047  0.46 
Ext%  0.800 0.795  –0.005  –0.04 
Judiciary   8.500 9.280  0.780  2.87  *** 
Rule of Law   9.174 9.634  0.460  2.78  *** 
Corruption  8.814 9.250  0.436  1.80  * 
Expropriation   9.726 9.733  0.007  0.16 
    
This table presents descriptive data for our sample.  Panel A presents the distribution by country.  In this panel, we present sample firms’ provision of investment 
property fair values in the pre-IFRS period, where “No FV” (“FV”) indicates the firm does not provide (provides) either recognized or disclosed fair values.  
Next, we present sample firms’ choice of the cost model with required fair value disclosure (“Cost”) or the fair value model (“FV”) under IAS 40 on adoption of 
IFRS.  Finally, we present the pre-IFRS domestic accounting treatment for investment property assets, indicating whether domestic GAAP required the cost 
model (“Cost Model”), revaluation model (“Reval Model”), or allowed a choice (i.e., indicated with an “X” under both the cost and revaluation models).  We 
also indicate whether domestic GAAP treated investment property as a part of property, plant, and equipment (“Treated as PP&E”), that is, did not have a 
specific accounting standard addressing this asset class.   
 
Panel B presents firm and country characteristics for the sample.  IP_TA is the percentage of reported total assets that consist of investment properties, assessed at 
the end of the mandatory IFRS adoption year.  Big4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm employs a Big Four auditing firm in the mandatory IFRS 
adoption year, and 0 otherwise.  Ext is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm employs an external appraiser to value its investment property in the mandatory 
IFRS adoption year, and 0 otherwise.  Ext% is the percentage of the firm’s investment property that is valued by an external appraiser in the mandatory IFRS 
adoption year.  Judiciary, Rule of Law, Corruption, and Expropriation are country level characteristics for the country in which the firm is domiciled, obtained 
from La Porta et al. (1998).  Judiciary is the efficiency of the judicial system (rated 0-10), where lower values indicate a less efficient judicial system.  Rule of 
Law is the assessment of the law and order tradition (rated 0-10), where lower scores indicate less tradition for law and order.  Corruption is the assessment of 
the corruption of the government (rated 0-10), where lower scores indicate higher levels of corruption.  Expropriation is the risk of outright confiscation or 
forced nationalization (rated 0-10), where lower scores indicate a higher risk of confiscation.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the less than 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, for two-tailed tests.   33
TABLE 3 
Causes of Providing Versus Not Providing  
Investment Property Fair Values Prior to IFRS 
 
Panel A.  Univariate analyses 
  No Fair Value  
(N = 18) 
  Fair Value  
(N = 59) 
 Differences 
(calculated as Fair Value – No Fair Value) 
 
Variable Mean  Median   Mean Median   Mean  p-value   Median  p-value 
                   
Descriptive Variable:                     
   MCAP  598 275 803 312 206 0.48  37  0.44 
   IP_TA  0.721 0.806  0.794 0.911   0.073 0.30    0.105  0.30 
                      
Experimental Variables:                     
   LIQ_COUNTRY  0.095 0.087  0.083 0.086   –0.012 0.08 *   –0.001  0.02 ** 
   CLOSEHELD  0.660 0.672  0.400 0.413   –0.260 <0.01 ***   –0.259  <0.01 *** 
   VOL_ADOPT  0.167 0.000  0.288 0.000   0.121 0.31    0.000  0.31 
   EPRA  0.111 0.000  0.475 0.000   0.363 <0.01 ***   0.000  <0.01 *** 
                     
Control Variables:                       
   SIZE  12.500 12.523  12.823 12.650  0.323 0.37   0.127 0.44 
   DEBT_MCAP  1.584 0.938  1.425 0.992   –0.159 0.82    0.055  0.73 
   CFO_MCAP  0.043 0.041  0.046 0.041   0.003 0.88    0.000  0.76 
 
Panel B.  Multivariate analyses 
Variable  Predicted  Coefficient (Wald Chi-Square) 
   Intercept  ?  7.394   (2.96) *  
    
Experimental Variables:     
   LIQ_COUNTRY  + / –  –6.029   (0.39) 
   CLOSEHELD  –  –3.640   (5.18) ** 
   VOL_ADOPT  +  0.346   (0.18) 
   EPRA  +  1.613   (2.33) * 
    
Control Variables:     
   SIZE  + / –  –0.333   (1.02)  
   DEBT_MCAP  + / –  –0.040   (0.06) 
   CFO_MCAP  + / –  0.463   (0.01) 
N   77 
Log Likelihood    18.581 *** 
% Concordant (discordant)    81% (19%) 
   
This table compares two groups of firms within the pre-IFRS period: those which do not provide investment 
property fair values (“No Fair Value”) and those that provide either recognized or disclosed investment property fair 
values (“Fair Value”).  The pre-IFRS period is the fiscal year preceding mandatory IFRS adoption.  All financial 
variables are expressed in millions of Euros, translated from local currencies where necessary at exchange rates 
effective as of the financial statement dates.  Panel A presents univariate comparisons.  Panel B presents multivariate   34
results from a logistic regression, wherein the dependent variable (FV_PRE) is equal to 1 if the firm provides either 
disclosed or recognized investment property fair values, and 0 otherwise.  We present coefficient estimates, with 
Wald Chi-square statistics shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the less than 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, for two-tailed tests in Panel A, and for one or two-tailed tests as indicated in Panel B.   
 
The variables are defined as:  
MCAP firm  i’s market capitalization (in millions of Euros) at the end of the fiscal year preceding 
IFRS adoption; obtained from Worldscope; 
IP_TA firm  i’s investment property divided by reported total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding IFRS adoption; investment property is based on reported historical cost (fair 
values) for those firms in the column labeled “No Fair Value” (“Fair Value”); obtained 
from hand-collection; 
  LIQ_COUNTRY  the percentage turnover of investment property for the entire property market of the 
country in which firm i is domiciled for the calendar year preceding mandatory IFRS 
adoption; obtained from Investment Property Databank; 
  CLOSEHELD  the percentage of firm i’s shares outstanding that are closely held at the end of the fiscal 
year preceding mandatory IFRS adoption; obtained from Worldscope and hand-
collection; 
  VOL_ADOPT  an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i voluntarily adopts IFRS prior to mandatory 
adoption, and 0 otherwise; obtained from Worldscope; 
  EPRA  an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is a member of EPRA (the European Public Real 
Estate Association) as of 2004, and 0 otherwise; obtained from hand-collection; 
  SIZE  the log of firm i’s market capitalization (adjusted to Euros) at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding mandatory IFRS adoption; obtained from Worldscope; 
  DEBT_MCAP firm  i’s reported short-term plus long-term debt, divided by the firm’s market 
capitalization, both measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding mandatory IFRS 
adoption; obtained from Worldscope; 
  CFO_MCAP firm  i’s reported cash flows from operations, divided by the firm’s market capitalization, 
both measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding mandatory IFRS adoption; obtained 
from Worldscope. 
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TABLE 4 
Consequences of Providing Versus Not Providing  
Investment Property Fair Values Prior to IFRS 
 
Panel A.  Univariate analysis 
Variable is BID_ASKPRE Mean    Median 
      
No Fair Value (N = 18)     3.448 3.193 
Fair Value (N = 59)  1.217  0.703 
Difference 2.231  2.490 
p-value  0.011 **  0.001 *** 
 
Panel B.  Multivariate analysis (dependent variable is LogBID_ASKPRE) 
Variable Predicted  Coefficient  (t-statistic) 
 
Intercept  ?  2.047   
(2.83) ***
1.707   
(2.34) ** 
1.894   
(2.95) *** 
LogPRICEPRE  –  0.025   
(0.41) 
0.036   
(0.59) 
0.039   
(0.64) 
LogVOLUMEPRE  –  –0.173   
(–3.14) ***




LogSTD_RETPRE  +  0.010   
(0.09)  
0.041   
(0.38)  
0.059   
(0.57)  
LogFFPRE  –  0.071   
(0.49) 
0.102   
(0.72) 




–  –0.530   
(–3.44) ***
–0.550   
(–3.64) ***
–0.562   
(–3.78) *** 
IMRPRE  + / –  –0.096   
(1.08) 
–0.050   
(–0.55)  
NO_FV_PRE  + 
 
0.443   
(2.00) ** 
0.474   
(2.23) ** 
N   77 77 77 
Adj-R
2    58.92% 60.64% 61.03% 
   
This table presents analyses of the economic consequences of firms providing versus not providing investment 
property fair values in the pre-IFRS period.  The pre-IFRS period is measured as the one month beginning three 
months following the fiscal year end preceding mandatory IFRS adoption.  Panel A presents univariate comparisons 
of bid-ask spreads across two groups of firms: those not providing investment property fair values in the pre-IFRS 
period (“No Fair Value”), and those providing either recognized or disclosed investment property fair values in the 
pre-IFRS period (“Fair Value”).  Panel B presents multivariate results, where the dependent variable is 
LogBID_ASKPRE.  We present coefficient estimates, with t-statistics indicated in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the less than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   36
The variables are defined as: 
BID_ASKPRE   firm i’s mean daily percentage bid-ask spread over the pre-IFRS period, calculated daily 
as the ask less the bid price, divided by the average of bid and ask prices; obtained from 
Datastream; 
LogBID_ASKPRE   the log of firm i’s mean daily percentage bid-ask spread over the pre-IFRS period, 
calculated daily as the ask less the bid price, divided by the average of bid and ask prices; 
obtained from Datastream; 
LogPRICEPRE  the log of firm i’s per share stock price, measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding 
mandatory IFRS adoption; obtained from Datastream; 
LogVOLUMEPRE  the log of firm i’s trading volume (expressed in thousands of Euros), calculated over the 
pre-IFRS period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogSTD_RETPRE  the log of firm i’s standard deviation of stock returns, calculated over the pre-IFRS 
period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogFFPRE  the log of firm i’s percentage of free float shares, measured at the end of the pre-IFRS 
period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogANALYSTPRE  the log of firm i’s analyst following (calculated as one plus analyst following), measured 
over the pre-IFRS period; obtained from IBES; 
IMRPRE  the inverse Mills ratio, obtained from estimation of the logistic model in Table 3 Panel B 
examining the determinants of firm i’s provision versus non-provision of investment 
property fair values in the pre-IFRS period;  
NO_FV_PRE  an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i does not provide either disclosed or recognized 
investment property fair values prior to mandatory IFRS adoption, and 0 otherwise; 
measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding mandatory IFRS adoption; obtained from 
hand-collection.   37
TABLE 5 
Does Required Provision of Investment Property Fair Values Under IAS 40 
Eliminate Perceived Differences Across Firms? 
 
Panel A.  Univariate analysis 
Variable is BID_ASKPOST Mean    Median 
      
No Fair Value (N = 18)     2.485 2.048 
Fair Value (N = 59)  1.005  0.714 
Difference 1.480  1.334 
p-value  0.021 **  0.004 *** 
 
Panel B.  Multivariate analysis (dependent variable is LogBID_ASKPOST) 
Variable Predicted  Coefficient  (t-statistic) 
 
Intercept  ?  2.570   
(3.90) ***
2.294   
(3.42) ***
LogPRICEPOST  –  0.036   
(0.58) 
0.042   
(0.69) 
LogVOLUMEPOST  –  –0.206   
(–4.37) ***
–0.204   
(–4.37) ***
LogSTD_RETPOST  +  0.159   
(1.28)  
0.195   
(1.57) *  
LogFFPOST  –  0.076   
(0.64) 




–  –0.332   
(–2.44) ***
–0.298   
(–2.19) ** 
NO_FV_PRE  + 
 
0.362 
 (1.66) ** 
N   77 77 
Adj-R
2   49.66%  50.85% 
   
This table presents results from analyses examining how firms were affected by required provision of investment 
property fair values under IAS 40 on mandatory adoption of IFRS.  Panel A provides univariate comparisons of bid-
ask spreads measured within the post-IFRS period across two groups of firms: those which do not provide 
investment property fair value prior to mandatory IFRS adoption (“No Fair Value”), and those that provide either 
recognized or disclosed investment property fair value prior to mandatory IFRS adoption (“Fair Value”).  The post-
IFRS period is measured as the one month beginning three months following the first fiscal year end of mandatory 
IFRS adoption.  Panel B presents multivariate analyses, where the dependent variable is LogBID_ASKPOST.  We 
present coefficient estimates, with t-statistics indicated in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the less 
than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The variables are defined as: 
BID_ASKPOST   firm i’s mean daily percentage bid-ask spread over the post-IFRS period, calculated daily 
as the ask less the bid price, divided by the average of bid and ask prices; obtained from 
Datastream; 
LogBID_ASKPOST     the log of firm i’s mean daily percentage bid-ask spread over the post-IFRS period, 
calculated daily as the ask price less the bid price, divided by the average of bid and ask 
prices; obtained from Datastream; 
LogPRICEPOST  the log of firm i’s per share stock price, measured at the end of the fiscal year of 
mandatory IFRS adoption; obtained from Datastream; 
LogVOLUMEPOST  the log of firm i’s trading volume (expressed in thousands of Euros), calculated over the 
post-IFRS period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogSTD_RETPOST  the log of firm i’s standard deviation of stock returns, calculated over the post-IFRS 
period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogFFPOST       the log of firm i’s percentage of free float shares, measured at the end of the post-IFRS 
period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogANALYSTPOST  the log of firm i’s analyst following (calculated as one plus analyst following), measured 
over the post-IFRS period; obtained from IBES; 
NO_FV_PRE  an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i does not provide either disclosed or recognized 
investment property fair values prior to mandatory IFRS adoption, and 0 otherwise; 
obtained from hand-collection.   39
TABLE 6 
Does Required Provision of Investment Property Fair Values Under IAS 40  
Mitigate Perceived Differences Across Firms? 
 
Panel A.  Univariate analysis of mean BID_ASK 
 Pre-IFRS  Post-IFRS  Change   
      
No Fair Value (N = 18)   3.448  2.485  –0.963  * 
Fair Value (N = 59)  1.217  1.005  –0.212 * 
Difference 2.231  1.480  –0.751   
 
Panel B.  Stacked multivariate analysis (dependent variable is LogBID_ASK) 
 
Comparisons of coefficients 
  Differences in Coefficients 
(t-statistic on difference) 
 




LogPRICEPOST – LogPRICEPRE    0.006   
(0.10) 
0.003   
(0.00) 
LogVOLUMEPOST – LogVOLUMEPRE    –0.024   
(–0.33) 
–0.045   
(–0.63) 
LogSTD_RETPOST – LogSTD_RETPRE     0.116   
(0.71)  
0.136   
(0.84)  
LogFFPOST – LogFFPRE    0.098   
(0.60) 
0.088   
(0.50) 
LogANALYSTPOST – LogANALYSTPRE 
 
  0.221   
(1.08) 
0.264   
(1.31) 




N   77  77 
    
This table presents results from analyses examining which firms were most affected by required provision of fair 
values under IAS 40 upon mandatory adoption of IFRS.  Two groups of firms are compared: those which do not 
provide investment property fair values in the pre-IFRS period (“No Fair Value”), and those that provide either 
recognized or disclosed investment property fair values in the pre-IFRS period (“Fair Value”).  Panel A presents 
univariate comparisons of the change in bid-ask spreads across the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods, calculated as 
[post-IFRS value] – [pre-IFRS value].  The pre-IFRS period is measured as the one month beginning three months 
following the fiscal year end preceding mandatory IFRS adoption; the post-IFRS period is measured as the one 
month beginning three months following the first fiscal year end of mandatory IFRS adoption.  Panel B presents 
results of stacked multivariate analyses to compare the coefficient estimates from the pre-IFRS analysis (Table 4 
Panel B) to those from the post-IFRS analysis (Table 5 Panel B).  We present differences in coefficient estimates, 
with t-statistics for two-tailed tests of differences indicated in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
less than 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The variables are defined as: 
BID_ASK  firm i’s mean percentage bid-ask spread measured either over the pre-IFRS or post-IFRS 
period; calculated daily as the ask less the bid price, divided by the average of bid and ask 
prices; obtained from Datastream; 
LogBID_ASK  the log of firm i’s mean percentage bid-ask spread, measured either over the pre-IFRS or 
post-IFRS period; calculated daily as the ask less the bid price, divided by the average of 
bid and ask prices; obtained from Datastream; 
LogPRICE  the log of firm i’s per share stock price, measured either in the pre-IFRS period (at the 
end of the fiscal year preceding mandatory IFRS adoption) or post-IFRS period (at the 
end of the fiscal year of mandatory IFRS adoption); obtained from Datastream; 
LogVOLUME  the log of firm i’s trading volume (expressed in thousands of Euros), measured either 
over the pre-IFRS or post-IFRS period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogSTD_RET  the log of firm i’s standard deviation of stock returns, measured either over the pre-IFRS 
or post-IFRS period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogFF  the log of firm i’s percentage of closely held shares, measured either over the pre-IFRS or 
post-IFRS period; obtained from Datastream; 
LogANALYST  the log of firm i’s analyst following (measured as one plus analyst following), measured 
either over the pre-IFRS or post-IFRS period; obtained from Datastream; 
NO_FV_PRE  an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i does not provide investment property fair values 
in the pre-IFRS period, and 0 otherwise; obtained from hand-collection. 
  
 